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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The plaintiff/respondent, Silver Creek Seed, LLC (Silver Creek), filed a Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial (Complaint) alleging breaches of contract and implied warranties against 
Sunrain Varieties LLC (Sunrain). The lmvsuit pertained to the purchase and sale of seed potatoes 
in 2012. (R Vol. I, pp. 15-25.) Sunrain answered and counterclaimed, asserting Silver Creek 
breached the contract by failing to pay for potatoes sold in 2013. (Id., pp. 26-37.) Silver Creek 
denied the Counterclaim. (Id., pp. 38-41.) The district court granted partial summary judgment to 
Silver Creek on the issue of whether Sunrain accepted a portion of the seed sold by Silver Creek. 
The parties tried the case to a jury in February 2015. Sunrain prevailed on its counterclaim on 
directed verdict. The jury returned a verdict and judgment was entered on March 13, 2015. 
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Complaint on October 1, 2013. (Id., pp. l The Complaint 
alleged that the parties agreed in 2012 for Silver Creek to grow proprietary seed and sell the seed 
to Sunrain pursuant to a Blanket Variety Contract (the Contract). (Id.) Silver Creek alleged that 
the seed provided by Sunrain was infected with bacterial ring rot (BRR), breaching the Contract 
and the implied warranties of merchantability. (Id.) 
On October 30, 2013, Sunrain filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Jury Demand 
(Answer). (Id., pp. 26-37.) The Answer denied the Complaint. The Counterclaim alleged breach 
of contract against Silver Creek for its failure to pay for seed purchased from Sunrain in 2013. 
(Id.) Silver Creek's Reply denied the Counterclaim. (Id., pp. 38-41.) 
On June L 2014. Silver Creek filed an Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
(Id., pp. 46-47.) Sunrain responded to Silver Creek's motion with a brief and affidavits. (Id., pp. 
67-75.) Both parties filed motions to strike. (Id., pp. 92-93; 115-117.) 
The district court heard oral argument on June 30, 2014. (See H'rg Tr., pp. 1-53.) The 
district court granted Silver Creek's motion to strike and mooted Sunrain's motion to strike. (Id., 
p. 17.) The district court granted Silver Creek's amended motion for summary judgment. (Id., pp. 
47-53; see also R Vol. I, pp. 123-25.) 
Sunrain moved to reconsider the district court's order on July 25, 2014. (Id .. pp. 126-77; 
R Vol. II, pp. 320-69.) Silver Creek filed a second partial summary judgment on July 28, 2014. 
(Id., pp. 178-80.) The district court heard arguments on September 15, 2014. (Hr'g Tr., pp. 55-
123.) The district court denied both motions. (Id.; see also R Vol. III, pp. 428-29.) 
Appellant Brief 7 
case to a from 2015. l 
district court entered judgment on March 13, 15. (R Vol. III, pp. 599-600.) The 
district court entered other orders on March 13, 2015, before Sunrain had a chance to respond to 
Silver Creek's request for prejudgment interest. (Id., pp. 601-03; R Vol. IV, pp. 604-05.) Sunrain 
filed its opposition to the Motion for Prejudgment Interest on March 17, 2015. (R Vol. IV, pp. 
606-12.) Sunrain also filed a Motion for Relief from Final Judgment on April 10, 2015. (Id., pp. 
767-68.) The district court denied Sunrain's motion. (Id., pp. 776-77.) 
Silver Creek sought attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and the 
Contract. (Id., pp. 613-753 .) Sunrain filed a Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees. (Id., 
pp. 757-58.) The district court entered its Decision on Attorney Fees and Costs on May 13, 2015. 
(Id., 783-92.) Sunrain filed its Notice of Appeal on April 2, 2015. (Id., pp. 759-66.) Sunrain filed 
an Amended Notice of Appeal on June 1, 2015. (Id., pp. 797-805.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Sunrain is a Delaware LLC licensed to do business in Idaho. (R Vol. I, pp. 16, 26.) 
Sunrain develops potato varieties for sale as seed potatoes, among other things. (Trial Tr., p. 
737.) Sunrain has several proprietary varieties, including A84 l 80-8, Red Fantasy, Laura, 
Annabelle, Rumba, Allian, and Carrera. (Id., pp. 632, 646.) Each variety is unique and has its 
own attributes that make it marketable. In addition to developing proprietary varieties, Sunrain 
sells the seed of other non-proprietary varieties, including Russet Burbanks. (Id., pp. 632-33.) 
Silver Creek, a farm based in Bellevue, Idaho, is owned by Mark Johnson and Jill 
Johnson. (Trial Tr., pp. 199-200.) Silver Creek grows Generation l or Generation 2 seed 
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p. 
essence growmg potatoes is fairly straightforward. Seed potato plants 
originate in labs where the plantlet grows in a petri dish. (Id.) The plantlet is harvested and sent 
to a greenhouse grower to grow an early generation seed potato. (Id.) The plantlets generate a 
mini-tuber, a small potato plant. (Id.) The harvested mini-tuber is a "prenuclear" generation. (Id., 
p. 201.) The prenuclear seed is sold to seed fanners for planting and when the seed grown from 
the prenuclear seed is harvested it is considered "nuclear" seed. (Id.) The nuclear seed is then 
harvested. (Id., p. 202.) The next spring the nuclear seed is planted and harvested thereby 
becoming Generation 1, or "G 1 s." (Id.) The process may be repeated, with each subsequent 
generation knovvn as 02, 03, etc. Generally, farmers do not replant G5s. (Id.) 
In the fall of 2011, Sunrain required storage for seed grown in Nevada. S unrain' s 
employee, Jeff Bragg, contacted Mark Johnson and asked about the availability of Silver Creek's 
storage. (Id., pp. 208-11.) Silver Creek agreed to store Sunrain's seed over the winter. (Id.) 
Sunrain delivered the potatoes to Silver Creek's storage in Carey, Idaho. (Id., p. 212.) All seed 
loads delivered to Silver Creek were certified and the parties received certification tags from the 
Idaho Crop Improvement Association (ICIA). (Id., pp. 319,325, 454-57.) The seed went into 
Silver Creek's storage until springtime. (Id., p. 212.) 
In 2012, Silver Creek offered to plant and grow the next generation of the seed. (Id., p. 
452.) The seed consisted of Sunrain's proprietary varieties and Sunrain had to agree to have 
Silver Creek plant the seed. (PL Ex. 5.) Sunrain and Silver Creek agreed that Silver Creek would 
plant grow, and harvest the next generation seed. (Id.) The parties entered into the Contract, 
Appellant Brief 9 
was 
(Derbidge ). (Id) After Silver Creek planted, grew and harvested the seed, Silver Creek would 
sell conforming seed, per the Contract, to Sunrain. (Id.) 
In 2012, Silver Creek planted the following Sunrain varieties: Laura, Allian, Red Fantasy, 
Annabelle, Carrera, A84180-8, and Rumba. (See Pl. Exs. 1-3.) Silver Creek harvested its crop 
and placed it into storage. (Trial Tr., p. 328.) In March 2012, ICIA tested the seed, using 
customary methods at the time, and the seed came back negative for BRR. (Def Ex. AA.) 
BRR is a bacterium that infects the vascular tissues of the potato plant. (Trial Tr., p. 356.) 
The infection causes wilt and rot from the inside out. (Id, p. 357.) BRR is a zero tolerance 
disease that is relatively easy to spread. (Id., pp. 357, 378.) Once BRR is in a seed lot it cannot be 
eliminated. (Id.) The bacterium that causes BRR is known as clavibacter michiganesis CV 
sepedonicus (CMS). (Id., p. 744.) The presence of CMS does not equate to BRR. (Id., p. 360.) 
In 2013, Sunrain arranged for a portion of the A84180-8s grown by Silver Creek to be 
shipped to Canada. (Id, pp. 401, 635.) NAFTArequires seed intended for exportation to be 
tested for bacterium and/or viruses. (Id.) Sunrain arranged for ICIA to administer a test known as 
ELISA, which was the customary test at the time, on the A84180-8s. (Id., pp. 459-60, 544.) The 
ELISA test returned a positive result for CMS in the A84180-8s. (Id., p. 744.) Sunrain bought 
and sold some of the A84180-8s to Wooten Farms, a third-party. 
ICIA contacted Silver Creek and Sunrain with the results. (Id., pp. 488, 494.) Johnson 
called Bragg. The test results astonished Bragg because the seed had come from Nevada, where 
Sunrain followed a strict cleaning protocol. (Id., p. 489.) There was also a March 2012 negative 
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test generation of A84 l told 
president, Mel Davenport (Davenport), about the results. (Trial Tr., pp. 496-97.) 
Following the results, Sunrain analyzed its seed sourcing and other production issues related to 
the seed. (Id, pp. 497-98.) Bragg and Johnson followed up and discussed the A84I80-8s' source. 
Bragg told Johnson the seed came from Nevada and that they had originally been grown on a 
farm in Washington owned by Greg Ebe. (Id., p. 500.) 
Shortly after the discovery of CMS in the A84 l 80-8s, Derbidge called Johnson to discuss 
the situation. (R Vol. I, p. 137.) Derbidge told Johnson that Sunrain rejected the remaining seed 
because it could not be recertified due to the positive CMS test. (Id, pp. 137-39.) The parties had 
three options: sell the potatoes on the fresh market, sell to a commercial grower with full 
disclosure, or sell the potatoes for cattle feed, all of which were permissible uses for seed with 
CMS/BRR. (Id., p. 138.) 
Silver Creek did additional testing on the seed. (Id, pp. 66-3, Exs. F, G, H.) All varieties 
except A84180-8s and Rumba came back negative for CMS. (Id.) These additional tests were 
done at Silver Creek's own initiative and not in coajunction with Sunrain. At the time CMS was 
discovered, Johnson informed Derbidge that he knew that the G2s, about 19,947.7 
hundredweight (cwt), were ineligible for recertification. (R Vol. I, p. 137; see also Def. Ex. G.) 
Silver Creek never attempted to have the "clean" seed certified. The parties knew they needed to 
cooperate to resolve the crop ineligible for recertification. (Id., pp. 137-39.) 
Sunrain and Silver Creek met in Picabo, Idaho, in late April 2013. (Id., p. 139.) Derbidge, 
Davenport, Bragg, Johnson, and his secretary, Nancy, were present. (Id.) The parties discussed 
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Derbidge about as 
we discussed where we were in the process of trying to find commercial growers that 
would be willing to accept the seed. And at that point, the conversation was had again, 
these don't meet our needs. Under the contract these won't meet our needs. We can't 
recertify. We can't sell them as certified seed because we've got a ring rot problem. The 
whole farm now has a black eye; now what do we do? 
(Id., p. 139, Dep. 23:2-9.) Derbidge further explained that he expressly rejected the potatoes as 
seed, that Sunrain would assist in Silver Creek clearing its storage, and that Sunrain could not 
use the potatoes as seed. (Id., Dep. 23:20-24:24.) Davenport told Johnson during the meeting that 
Sunrain did not accept the seed because it was not certifiable seed. (R Vol. I, p. 149.) Davenport 
explained that Sunrain would not be left "holding the bag" on the entire pile of seed because it 
was non-certifiable. (Id.) The potatoes did not meet certification, were, thus, nonconforming to 
the Contract, and properly rejected. (Id.; R Vol. I, pp. 137-39, 141.) At no point after the CMS 
discovery did Silver Creek certify the seed crop. For early generation seed, like G2s, a grower 
cannot replant them if there is ring rot on a farm. (R Vol. I, p. 141.) Thus, the presence of the 
CMS eviscerated the crop's value to Sunrain. 
Sunrain attempted to work with Silver Creek to resolve the issue of the defective seed in 
a way that worked for both parties. (Id., p. 149.) The intent was to find a course allowing both 
parties to remain in business. (Id., p. 140.) The parties decided to sell the 2012 crop as cattle 
feed. (Id., p. 143.) The parties agreed that the proceeds from the cattle feed sales would 
ultimately be paid to Silver Creek. (Id.) 
On May 14, 2013, after the CMS discovery, Sunrain paid Silver Creek $175,000. (R Vol. 
II, p. 366.) Derbidge explained the $175,000 payment as follows: 
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on as 
A. Well, like I say, we were trying to help Mark out. We were trying to make sure Mark -
Mark was very frank with us that he was in big financial trouble. That any disruption in 
his cash flow could cause him to lose everything. We did not want to see that happen to 
Mark. As much as we've had all these issues with all of this, I still think Mark is a 
phenomenal person, and we did not want in any way, shape, or form want to see Mark go 
under, so we were trying to help him out. 
Q. So is it your testimony that this $175,000 wasn't for a deposit for those potatoes, but 
was just because you, being Sunrain, just felt bad about the whole situation? 
A. Correct. We were trying to help him out. Trying to help keep him afloat. That's the 
vein of all our negotiations with Mark. 
(Id., pp. 366-67.) At this time Silver Creek was Sunrain's customer. It was also purchasing other 
seed from Sunrain, i.e., the seed that is the basis for the counterclaim. Sunrain viewed Silver 
Creek as a partner and made the payment to relieve some of the pressure caused by the BRR. 
At the same time, from a financial perspective, Sunrain had to deal with its own internal 
accounting for the BBR infected crop and the payments made, if any, to Silver Creek that related 
back to the relationship with Silver Creek. Sunrain's treasurer, Lisa Swenson (Swenson), 
prepared an internal spreadsheet to track payments made to Silver Creek and booked the 
payment for internal purposes against the crop. (Id., p. 324.) Swenson's spreadsheet tracked 
payments received from third-parties for A84180-8s that were shipped prior to the positive CMS 
test. (Id., p. 337.) The spreadsheet also tracked the $175,000 payment to Silver Creek. (Id.) The 
spreadsheet notes that the information concerning the $175,000 payment were Swenson's "rough 
guess on how this [payment] might be considered spread among the varieties." (Id.) The 
spreadsheet was not given to Silver Creek and was solely an internal document. (Trial Tr., p. 
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$1 amount does not relate to amount to 
Creek and Sunrain coordinated on shipping the remaining 2012 crop to cattle feed 
after the seed had been rejected. (See R Vol. I, p. 143; see also Def Ex. 0.) Derbidge authorized 
the shipment to cattle feed on Sunrain's behalf. (R Vol. II, p. 321.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. \Vhether the district court erred in denying Sunrain's Motion to Reconsider. 
B. Whether the district court erred by excluding evidence of the ICIA's 
certification tags, including rulings on disclaimers and limitations of remedies. 
C. Whether the district court erred in admitting hearsay testimony, over Sunrain's 
objections, pertaining to the presence of bacterial ring rot on Ebe Farms. 
D. Whether the district court erred in its instructions to the jury. 
E. Whether the district court erred in awarding Silver Creek prejudgment interest. 
F. \Vhether the district court erred in awarding Silver Creek its attorney fees and 
costs. 
HI. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Sunrain claims attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and the Contract. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The district court erred when it denied Sunrain's Motion to Reconsider. 
1. Standard of Review. 
The standard of review for a motion to reconsider is the same as the underlying motion: 
When a district court decides a motion to reconsider, "the district court must apply the 
same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is 
being reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 
(2012). If the original order was within the trial court's discretion, then so is the decision 
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the motion to vve 
or a for we use the same 
court used in deciding the motion for reconsideration. Id 
Int 'l Real Estate Solutions, Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 819, 340 P.3d 465, 468 (2014). In 
Fragnella, the Court wrote: 
[W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration following the grant 
of summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a 
genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. In this case, the trial court 
was asked to reconsider the granting of a motion for summary judgment, so the summary 
judgment standard applied both to the trial court deciding the motion for reconsideration 
and to our review of that decision on appeal. 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
Thus, the new facts presented by Sunrain should have been viewed in a light most 
favorable to Sunrain. See IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c) (2014). 
2. There were triable issues whether Sunrain rejected the seed. 
Because Silver Creek's crop did not conform to the Contract and did not tender delivery 
of conforming seed, Sunrain was entitled to reject the entire crop. 
The UCC entitles a buyer to reject defective goods. IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 28-2-601. To be 
effective, rejection must occur within a "reasonable time" after the "delivery or tender" of the 
goods. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-2-602(1 ). Contrary to Silver Creek's assertion on the original 
motion, there was evidence that Sunrain rejected the entire crop of seed, less those delivered to 
Wootens, and that the rejection occurred in a reasonable time and was communicated to Silver 
Creek. Indeed, it appears from the evidence that Sunrain communicated the rejection to Silver 
Creek on more than one occasion and by multiple agents. (See R Vol. L pp. 137, 139, 146-50.) 
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rejection was abundant 
Derbidge testified that he informed Johnson of the rejection by phone within a week of learning 
of the non-conformity of the seed and in person within less than a month. (Id, pp. 137-39.) 
Davenport testified he also told Johnson Sunrain rejected the defective seed in person within less 
than a month of discovery of the non-conformity. (Id., pp. 146-50.) Yet in a crippling move, the 
district court's grant of partial summary judgment and denial of the motion to reconsider 
precluded Sunrain from presenting any of this evidence to the jury and prejudiced Sunrain's 
defense as to all of the issues tried in February 2015. Because Sunrain had the right to reject and 
did actually reject the crop, summary judgment holding Sunrain responsible for the Contract 
price for the seed was inappropriate and the Court should reverse and order a new trial. 
In its motion for partial summary judgment, Silver Creek discussed the seed in distinct 
categories. One included the contaminated seed of the A84 l 80-8 seed taken by Sunrain before 
discovery of the CMS and delivered to Wooten Farms. The second included the contaminated 
seed that the parties agreed, after the CMS discovery, to send to cattle feed. 1 The third category 
consisted of the "clean" seed of which Sunrain declined to take delivery after learning it would 
be ineligible for recertification as required by the Contract. Each category will be addressed. 
With respect to the third category, allegedly clean seed of which Sunrain declined to take 
delivery, the rejection resolved the issues and closed the transaction. Section 2-602 of the UCC 
discusses the method and manner ofrejection, with which Sunrain fully complied. IDAHO CODE 
1 This category does not include the potatoes sold by Silver Creek without Sunrain's approval to 
cattle feed, of which Silver Creek retained approximately $20,000 in proceeds without disclosing 
it to Sunrain. (Hr' g Tr., p. 96) 
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§ 28-2-602(2).2 did not exercise any ownership the after rejection and 
never took physical possession of it. The seed was non-conforming and was rightfully rejected 
because it was not certified and failed to meet the other contractual standards for acceptable seed. 
Once the non-conforming seed was rejected, Sunrain had no obligations. 
With respect to the second category, the contaminated seed taken by Sunrain to cattle 
feed, it was released to Sunrain, after rejection, and without being "inspected, tagged, sealed. and 
certified" as required if tendered under the Contract without rejection. (R Vol. I, pp. 66-15 
through 66-19.) The evidence suggests that this seed was not released to Sunrain as part of the 
Contract, but as a result of Sunrain' s efforts to help Silver Creek clear its storage. This was, at 
best, a factual dispute for the jury. Derbidge testified the removal of seed as cattle feed was done 
in conjunction with Silver Creek. (Id., p. 143.) Sunrain did not exercise ownership after rejection, 
but merely took possession of the non-conforming seed with Silver Creek's awareness and 
consented to deliver them as cattle feed for Silver Creek's benefit. Such actions were consistent 
with Section 28-2-603, which provides that a merchant buyer, when in possession of rejected 
goods, has a duty to "follow any reasonable instructions received from the seller with respect to 
the goods and in the absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell them for 
seller's account if they are perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily." IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 28-2-602( 1 ). The evidence supported a finding of a cooperative effort to move the non-
conforming seed as cattle feed with Sunrain following reasonable instructions from Silver Creek. 
Sunrain made reasonable efforts to sell the perishable seed for Silver Creek's pursuant to Section 
2 Thus, there was a factual issue whether Sunrain's rejection was rightful. 
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an as 
but it rightfully rejected the seed and had no obligation with respect to the contract rates. 
The district court expressly recognized that the information presented to it in support of 
the motion to reconsider could "stand as evidence of reiection." (Hr' 2: Tr.. n. 110.) The district 
.,,, ' ..._, ,, L / 
court's discussion on page 110 of the hearing transcript is completely at odds with the district 
court's refusal to vacate the partial summary judgment because the judge recognized the 
evidence of Sunrain clearly communicating to Silver Creek it rejected all of the undelivered seed 
on the basis of non-conformity with the Contract and breach of warranty. There was evidence 
that the rejection was unambiguous and unequivocal. Regardless of the district court's view, 
whether the rejection was unequivocal constituted a classic fact issue for the jury. 4 Anderson 
U.C.C. § 2-602:9 (3d. ed.); ICS!Executone Telecom, Inc. v. Performance Parts Warehouse, Inc., 
171 A.D.2d 1066, 569 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (1991); 1\Janni E. Graniti D'ltalia Sicilmarmi Sp.A. v. 
Universal Granite and 1\Jarble, 757 F.Supp.2d 773, 72 U.C.C.Rep.Serv.2d 1158 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 
(applying Illinois law). Both Davenport and Derbidge testified that they rejected the seed on the 
basis that the potatoes could not be certified, as articulated, supra. 
In order to reach its confused holding, the district court interjected the doctrine of 
ratification sua :,ponte. The district court concluded that Sunrain's payment of $175,000 in May 
2013 "operates as a ratification of the contract, as I've indicated, or it operates as evidence that 
the contract was not rejected." (Hr' g Tr., p. 111.) Yet, ratification is a jury question on disputed 
facts. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 669, 52 P.3d 307, 
313 (2002). Even if the $175,000 was evidence suggesting that the Contract was ratified, the 
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IS one is not context 
facts on this issue should not have been construed against Sunrain because Silver Creek was the 
moving party on summary judgment. The jury could have viewed the factual question and seen 
the evidence differently that the district court. Hence, the district court erred. 
The $175,000 payment was not conclusive proof that Sunrain ratified the Contract after 
rejection. Sunrain paid Silver Creek $175,000 in May 2013 in an effort to help Silver Creek 
remain financially afloat. In fact, the $175,000 was not even an invoiced amount from Silver 
Creek. Silver Creek invoiced Sunrain $225,232.00 in May 2013. (R Vol. II, p. 332.) Since 
Sunrain had rejected the potatoes it did not pay that invoice. (Id.) Sunrain, as an ongoing 
business partner, paid Silver Creek an amount intended to assist Silver Creek with cash flow 
issues as the parties worked through issues. (R Vol. I, p. 137; see also R Vol. II, pp. 366-67.) The 
foregoing facts should have been construed in Sunrain's favor, the non-moving party. 
Reasonable inferences suggested that Sunrain rejected the seed and that the payment did not 
ratify the Contract as a matter of law. 
There were also no partial payments made to Silver Creek after the discovery of the 
CMS. Sunrain fully paid for the A84 l 80-8s it bought and then sold to Wootens before the CMS 
discovery. (R Vol. II, p. 331.) After the CMS positive result and rejection, Sunrain made one 
payment to Silver Creek: the $175,000. (R Vol. II, pp. 332. 366-67.) The payment was allocated 
internally by Swenson to tie out the 2012 crop for internal purposes. Sunrain's internal treatment 
of the payment is irrelevant to whether Sunrain met the statutory requirement of rejection. 
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The the court failed to the CMS/BRR 
discovery dramatically altered the trial landscape. It resulted in the district court erroneously 
instructing the jury that Sunrain accepted the crop and that Sunrain was obliged to pay the 
contract rate for the seed, notwithstanding the absence of evidence establishing conformity with 
all contractual terms. (See R Vol. III, pp. 572-73, 584.) The district court's incorrect grant of 
partial summary judgment prejudiced Sunrain throughout trial. Thus, the Court should reverse 
the district court, vacate the judgment, and remand for a new trial on all issues. 
3. The district court erred when it denied Sunrain's Motion to Reconsider. 
The district court gave Silver Creek the benefit of evidentiary inferences and 
interpretations even though Silver Creek was the original moving party and not entitled to the 
favorable treatment during the motion to reconsider. See IDAHO R. C!v. P. 56(c). The district 
court improperly applied the law governing summary judgment. Consequently, this Court should 
reverse the district court, vacate the judgment, and order a new trial. 
New facts are relevant to reconsideration under Rule l l(a)(2)(B). Coeur d'Alene 1Vining 
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank ofN. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812,823,800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). The 
burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts. Id. After the 
hearing on Silver Creek's Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Silver Creek's 
counsel deposed Sunrain representatives and elicited new facts that bore on the correctness of the 
district court's ruling. Sunrain submitted the facts to the district court and a full hearing was held. 
The district court's partial summary judgment order decided, as a matter oflaw, that "the 
seed potato lots that did not test positive for [CMS] (referred to as 'bacterial ring rot') conformed 
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to Variety multiple 
criteria explicit in the Contract in addition to those related to disease. (R Vol. I, p. 123.) Sunrain 
presented evidence that the specific seed lots did not conform to contractual requirements. 3 
Under the Contract's terms, Silver Creek made certain agreements and covenants with 
respect to the 2012 seed crop that were breached as a result of the CMS/BRR presence in the 
crop. Silver Creek also expressly warranted that the seed would be "of merchantable quality as 
set forth herein" and that it would be "fit for their intended use." (R Vol. I, pp. 66-15 through 
19.) By entering into the Contract, Silver Creek warranted that the seed would "pass without 
objection in the trade under the contract description'' and be "fit for the ordinary purposes for 
which such goods are used." IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 28-2-314(2)(a) & (c). It further warranted that 
the seed not only would be fit for its ordinary purpose, but it would be fit for the specific purpose 
for which Sunrain required, e.g., producing future certified seed generations. Id. at§ 28-2-314. 
Silver Creek failed to tender delivery of seed that could be used in the production of 
future generations of certified seed and expressly acknowledged, through Johnson, that the seed 
grown on its farm during 2012 could not be used for future seed production. (R Vol. I, p. 137.) 
As a result, Silver Creek breached the express warranty in the Contract. After the CMS/BRR was 
discovered, no loads of seed from Silver Creek were ever certified. The loads never received 
certification tags There ,vas no evidence that the seed standards identified above were met by 
3 The Contract contained several requirements for the seed crop beyond just the certification 
standard. The Contract provided: size restrictions on the seed ( 1-1/2 oz to 9 oz), wei~ht 
parameters, methodologies for calculating yield per acre, incorporation of the Sunram growing 
protocol standards, and other standards and requtrements. (See PI. Ex. 5.) Silver Creek failed to 
present evidence the seed crop met any of these standards on summary judgment. 
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delivered crop. These were, at a triable that a jury should 
have resolved prior to resolving the issues raised by Silver Creek. Thus, the district court erred. 
Silver Creek failed to tender delivery of seed that could be used in the production of 
future generations of certified seed and expressly acknowledged through Johnson that the seed 
grown on its farm during 2012 could not be used for future seed production. (R Vol. I, p. 13 7.) 
Silver Creek breached the implied warranty set forth in Section 2-314 and the companion express 
\Varranty in the Contract. Thus, the district court erred by denying Sunrain' s motion. 
Silver Creek knew Sunrain intended to acquire seed to produce future certified seed 
generations and that Sunrain relied on Silver Creek's skill to accomplish this purpose. (R Vol. I, 
pp. 66-15 through 19.) The Contract expressly states as much. (Id., p. 66-16.) It further provides 
Sunrain is contracting with Silver Creek because it "is in the business to supply certified potato 
seed." (Id.) Beyond the plain language of the Contract, Johnson testified without equivocation 
that the crop he was selling to Sunrain "were to be grown for seed potatoes" by "[w]hoever 
Sunrain sold them to." (Id., p. 132.) 
The seed produced by Silver Creek in 2012 was not fit for the production of future 
generations of certified seed. The ICIA rules for seed potato certification provide, "All contact 
lots on a farming operation shall be ineligible for recertification if any lot of seed on that farming 
operation is rejected for certification because of bacterial ring rot." (Id., p. 66-54.) A contact lot 
is defined to include any seed lot "produced on a farming operation using common production 
and handling equipment and/or storage facilities." (Id., p. 66-57.) Because all seed lots produced 
by Silver Creek during 2012 were contact lots vis-a-vis the contaminated A84180-8 variety, they 
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were ineligible for ICIA told seed lots on were 
ineligible for recertification. (Id., pp. 66-20 through 24.) Critically, Johnson conceded the point 
in asserting his damage claim when he testified, "This is the seed that we had to buy because our 
seed was unrecertifiable [sic] due to the contamination of ring rot in our lots. We could not plant 
back our own seed. So we had to buy new seed .... We couldn't recertify our seed, so we had to 
go out and buy all new seed." (R Vol. I, p. 134.) When Sunrain and Silver Creek were 
negotiating, all parties believed that the seed could not be certified. Thus, there were triable 
issues whether the seed conformed to the Contract and the district court erred as described above. 
In addition to the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, Silver Creek breached the 
warranty of merchantability. Again, this warranty was both express and implied. Silver Creek 
expressly warranted the seed will be "of a merchantable quality as set forth herein," and Section 
14 of the UCC implies the warranty of merchantability. IDAHO Com: ANN. § 28-2-314( 1 ). To 
be merchantable, goods must pass without objection in the trade under the contract description 
and be fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. Id. at§ 28-2-314(2)(a) & (c). 
As a merchant, Silver Creek possessed the obligation to tender seed that would pass 
without objection in the trade under the contract description and be fit for its ordinary purpose 
vis-a-vis that description, namely, as certified seed. As discussed above, the seed to be supplied 
by Silver Creek was early generation seed intended for Sunrain' s use in the production of future 
certified seed generations. (R Vol. I, pp. 66-15 through 19.) Because of the CMS presence in the 
seed produced on Silver Creek's farms, all other seed produced on the farm became ineligible for 
recertification. As such, it was not merchantable. The seed could not pass without objection in 
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and it was not for seed 
VHJ,h.JVU testified that Silver Creek could not plant back its own seed. (R Vol. I, p. 134.) 
Even that portion of the seed that was not intended for use in developing future 
generations of certified seed was not passable without objection in the industry or fit for its 
ordinary use. Derbidge testified that Sunrain intended to replant all first and second generation 
seed for the development of seed, but that third generation seed was to be sold to commercial 
growers for production. (Id., p. 141.) A review of Silver Creek's planting records reveals that the 
only third generation seed planted by Silver Creek was the A84180-8 variety, which ultimately 
proved to be contaminated with CMS. (Id., pp. 66-20 through 24.) The diseased seed could not 
be certified and was not sellable as certified. (Id.) 
4. There were triable issues of fact whether the defects substantially 
impaired the value of the whole contract. 
In addition to the foregoing issues related to warranties, express and implied, there were 
triable issues of material fact whether Silver Creek breached the entire contract when it tendered 
delivery of seed contaminated with BRR. The Contract is an installment contract, as defined by 
Section 2-612 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-2-612(1 ). The 
delivery of a CMS contaminated load breached the whole contract because the CMS presence 
destroys the seed's value, contaminated or otherwise. "Whenever nonconformity or default with 
respect to one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is 
a breach of the whole." Id.§ 28-2-612(3). 
As discussed in more specific detail above, the value of the whole contract to Sunrain 
was lost because the contaminated seed could not be certified and sold for commercial 
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was for 
could not be grown to develop future generations of certified seed, the contract value was 
impaired. Sunrain did not receive the benefit of its bargain and if required to accept the seed 
tendered by Silver Creek, it would have been left holding seed that could neither be sold for 
commercial production nor used for development of future generations of seed. The district court 
had evidence supporting this notion but chose to ignore it to affirm its prior mling. 
\\'hether a breach in one installment substantially impairs the value of the whole contract 
and thus amounts to a breach of the whole is a question of fact. See, e.g., Cranesville Block Co. 
Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 208 A.D.2d 1157, 1159, 617 N.Y.S.2d 951, 953 (1994). 
Based on Silver Creek's failure to tender delivery of seed that was merchantable, fit for its 
ordinary use, or fit for its particular intended use under the Contract, there were facts from which 
a jury could conclude that the presence of CMS in one or more installments impaired the value 
of the entire contract and therefore summary judgment was not proper. 
B. The district court erred when it excluded evidence about ICIA certification tags, 
including evidence concerning disclaimer of warranties and limitation of remedies. 
1. Standard of Review. 
The district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hansen v. 
Roberts, 154 Idaho 469,472,299 P.3d 781, 784 (2013). 
2. Argument. 
Sunrain sought to present evidence about disclaimers of ,varranties and limitations of 
remedies by offering the ICIA certification "blue tags." The district court incorrectly excluded 
Sunrain's evidence, which goes to the heart of the case regarding warranties, remedies, and 
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certification tags became a part of the parties' agreement, was a question of fact for the jury. 
The district court improperly excluded the evidence, improperly prevented the jury from 
considering the question of fact, and erred when it concluded that the portion of the tags that 
disclaimed \Varranties were not a part of the parties' agreement 
"The sale of certified seed is subject to statutory regulation." Duffin v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1004, 895 P.2d 1195, 1197 (1995). The statutory authority 
granted to the University ofldaho has been delegated to ICIA Id., at 1004-05, 895 P.2d at 1197-
98. "The Rules of Certification define 'certification' as meaning 'that the potatoes have been 
inspected ... and found to meet the grade requirements for certified seed at the time of 
inspection, based on the sample inspected."' Id., at 1011, 895 P.2d at 1204. The Rules of 
Certification state that "certification does not constitute a warranty of the [ICIA ], or the grower 
of certified seed regarding any characteristic of the seed .... " Id. The certification tags, or "blue 
tags," contain language disclaiming all warranties. Id., at 1012, 895 P.2d at 1205. "Printed on the 
certification tags is also a provision claiming to limit the purchaser's remedy to a 'return of the 
purchase price of the seed'" and a statement that the warranty and liability disclaimer along with 
the limitation of remedies constitute the final agreement of the parties on those topics. Id. The 
tags state that the tags' terms are an express condition of the sale between the parties. Id. 
Idaho Code§ 22-502 provides, "All potatoes sold or offered for sale as 'Idaho certified 
seed potatoes' must be packed, tagged and sealed in accordance with the Idaho rules of 
certification as authorized under chapter 15, title 22, Idaho Code." IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 22-502. 
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22-503(1) ... "shall certified" .... at§ 
503(1). Terms disclaiming warranties or limiting remedies are enforceable if they are a part of 
the parties' contract or became a part of the contract "through a course of dealing or trade 
usage." Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1012, 895 P.2d at 1205. The back of the ICIA tags state, in part: 
Since the use of certified seed potatoes is beyond the control of the grower, the seller, the 
inspector, the Idaho Federal-State Inspection Service, and the Idaho Crop Improvement 
Association, Inc., no H'arranty of any kind express or impliecl, including merchantability, 
fitness for a particular purpose, quality or freedom from disease, is made concerning 
these seed potatoes which extends beyond the description set forth above. 
The grower, the seller, the inspector, the Federal-State Inspection Service and the Idaho 
Crop Improvement Association, Inc. shall not be liable under any theory, including 
breach of warranty, negligence or strict liability, for any special or consequential loss or 
damage, including lost profits, resulting from the use of these seed potatoes. 
By acceptance of these seed potatoes, buyer expressly agrees that buyer's exclusive 
remedy for breach of any warranty or breach of any duty owed buyer with respect to 
certification under any theory of recovery, including negligence and strict liability, shall 
be limited in all events to a return of the purchase price of the seed. In addition, by 
acceptance of these seed potatoes, buyer expressly agrees that the disclaimer of warranty 
and limitation of remedy and liability set forth herein are express conditions of the sale, 
and that they constitute the entire, exclusive and final agreement between the parties 
regarding warranty, liability or remedy. 
(See Def Ex. Y(2) (emphasis added).) 
Implied warranties may be excluded "by course of dealing, course of performance, or 
usage of trade." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-2-3 l 6(3)(c). Prior dealings, familiarity with the 
certification rules, or prior tag use is evidence of the foregoing. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1012, 895 
P.2d at 1205. Both parties were sophisticated seed potato market participants and familiar with 
the disclaimer of warranties. 
At trial, Sunrain made multiple attempts to admit an identical exemplar of the 
certification tag because no party disputed whether the seed sold to Silver Creek was certified. 
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p. Despite testimony from both the court back 
blue tag exemplar, while nevertheless assuming "that every load of potatoes had a blue tag, 
even the ones that came from Nevada." (Id., p. 596.) The district court also found that "there 
isn't a load of potatoes that moves in the State ofidaho without a blue tag." (Id.) Inexplicably, 
the district court admitted the front side of the blue tag (Exhibit Y(l)) but excluded the back side 
of the blue tag (Exhibit Y(2)), along with all testimony about the tag's disclaimers, limitation of 
remedies, and that these terms were agreed upon terms and conditions of the sale. (Id., pp. 598-
603.) Contrary to fundamental contract law whereby all statutes and rules relevant to a 
transaction become part of any contract, the district court said, "[S]imply having it be put on a 
tag that certifies that the load ,vas inspected does not make that part of the bargain between 
plaintiff and defendant." (Id., p. 603 ); see CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 
379,388,299 P.3d 186, 195 (2013) (citing Gen. lvfotors Corp. v. Romein. 503 U.S. 181, 188, 112 
S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 117 L.Ed.2d 328, 338 ( 1992) ( citation omitted)). This is exactly what the Court 
stated in Duffin, prior to holding that the issue of whether the disclaimers/limitations became a 
part of the bargain is a question of fact. Ditffin, 126 Idaho at 1011-12, 895 P.2d 1204-05. 
Despite testimony from both parties and citations to the Idaho Code about the tags, the 
district court also found that there was a lack of foundation as to "staPdard of usage, the course 
of trade. anything else." (Id.) Each time Sunrain attempted to lay the foundation articulated in 
Duffin, the district court stopped Sunrain. Thus, not only was Sunrain prejudiced by the jury not 
being able to make a finding on the issue of whether the disclaimers/limitations became part of 
the Contract, but the district court denied Sunrain the chance to lay any necessary foundation. 
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to appropriately apply the 
of allowing the jury to know what was actually written on the back of the blue tags, the 
district court improperly withheld information relevant to both the facts and the law presented to 
the jury. This, in tum, empowered Silver Creek to make the same misleading argument that there 
were implied warranties that Sunrain breached, when there was clear evidence that Sunrain had 
disclaimed all warranties. Regardless, a jury should have decided what, if any, warranties 
existed. Diiffin, 126 Idaho at 1012, 895 P.2d at 1205. 
When Silver Creek received the seed from Silver Creek in 2011, it was in the process of 
being certified and going through the winter grow-out process. (Trial Tr., pp. 319, 453-58, 535, 
682.) Silver Creek admitted that the seed received certification tags from ICIA. (Id., pp. 319, 
324.) Bragg testified that he met the inspectors at Silver Creek to get the tags for the seed. (Id., 
pp. 456-57.) This occurred after the winter grow-out in 2012 and coextensive with the agreement 
for Silver Creek to grow the seed. Silver Creek acknowledged that as a seed sales company it 
knew what the blue tags were and that they are placed on their trucks prior to leaving Silver 
Creek's facility with its seed. (Id., p. 324.) Silver Creek admitted that Sunrain fulfilled its 
obligations under the Contract to provide Silver Creek with certified seed. (Id., p. 325.) Silver 
Creek acknowledged that it used the tags on every load that it shipped. (Id., pp. 324, 584, 589-
90.) The tag. as an industry anri trade standard, is attached to every load of outgoing seed 
potatoes. (Id., p. 585); see also IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 22-502. In fact, Johnson testified that "you 
have to have one of these on the truck" when shipping certified seed. (Id.) Johnson 
acknowledged that the tags constituted "representations that [he made] to the buyer" of his seed. 
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p. 59L) was not to 
foundation for common use in the industry, course of performance, and course of dealing. 
Thus, the district court had evidence before it, and even assumed as a fundamental aspect 
of the industry, that the tags are commonly used. Johnson testified that he used the tags on his 
own seed. (Id., pp. 324, 584, 589-90.) Sunrain testified that it used the tags in general and 
specifically with respect to this seed. (Id., pp. 652-72.) The law requires the certification, i.e., 
tagging, of seed loads or totes. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-502. The district court's statement that it 
lacked the foundation necessary to admit Exhibit Y(2) ignored the evidence and was erroneous.4 
The Duffin case stands for the proposition that whether the tags became a part of the 
parties' transaction is a fact issue. See Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1011-12, 895 P.2d 1204-05. In 
Di!ffin, the Court had evidence of the parties' prior dealings, that the parties were familiar with 
the Rules of Certification, and that the parties had previously used the certification tags. Id. at 
1012, 895 P.2d at 1205. The Court found that was sufficient to generate a triable issue of fact 
whether the tags disclaimed the implied warranties and were a part of the agreement. Id. 
Here, the district court had similar evidence. The district court had evidence that both 
parties were familiar with the Rules of Certification, had previously used the tags, and that tags 
were common and used widely in Idaho, pursuant to Idaho law. Sunrain told the district court 
about the Duffin holding. (Trial Tr.. pp. 599-661, 790-804.) The jury should have been allowed 
to decide the issue. Thus, the district court erred when it incorrectly excluded Exhibit Y(2) and 
the testimony concerning the disclaimer that Sunrain put into the record. (Id., pp. 652-72.) 
4 Sunrain offered the evidence in the form of an offer of proof. (See Trial Tr., pp. 652-672.) 
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court even offer was 
meeting the "foundational requirements for course of dealing and usage of trade. (Id., 
p. 671, IL 11-15.) Yet, it still ruled that the jury not decide the issue of warranty disclaimer. 
The district court also improperly prohibited Sunrain from arguing that the certification 
tags limited Silver Creek's remedies. The district court's ruling excluding Exhibit Y(2) and the 
testimony about the limitation of remedies constituted an abuse of discretion leading to yet 
another profoundly prejudicial evidentiary error. Duffin clearly held that whether the remedy 
limitation became a part of the agreement is also a fact question. Dl{ffin, 126 Idaho at 1012, 895 
P.2d at 1205. The jury should have been allowed to consider the effects of the tag's language. 
Instead, the district court excluded the back side of the blue tags, preventing the jury from even 
considering the factual issues, and specifically instructed the jury contrary to the tag's limitation 
language. The Court should reverse and order a new trial. 
C. The district court erred by admitting hearsay testimony by Jeff Bragg. 
1. Standard of Review 
Admission of testimony by a trial court is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rowan v. 
Riley, 139 Idaho 49, 54, 72 P.3d 889, 894 (2003). 
2. Argument 
During trial, the district court admitted Jeff Bragg's ueposition testimony. Bragg, a 
former Sunrain employee, testified as to what a third-party, Greg Ebe, told him. According to 
Bragg, Ebe told Bragg that Ebe had found BRR on his Washington farm. Sunrain's counsel 
objected to Bragg's testimony as to Ebe's statements as hearsay. The district court abused its 
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used it to establish that Sunrain' s production chain was the source of the CMS/BRR, including 
using Ebe's hearsay as the foundation provided to Silver Creek's expert.5 
Idaho's Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other than one made hy the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." IDAHO R. Evm. 80I(c) (2014). Admissions of a party opponent are not hearsay. 
Id. 801 ( d)(2). Hearsay statements are inadmissible. Id. 802. 
The following occurred during trial with regard to Bragg's testimony: 
Q. Are you aware of any instances of ring rot being found in Greg Ebe' s potatoes? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Avondet: I'm going to object to the form. Calls for hearsay. 
The Court: Overruled. 
A. I did. 
Q. (By Mr. Wright) Are you aware of any ring rot being found in Greg Ebe's potatoes? 
Mr. A vondet: Same objection. 
The Court: You can answer that and then we' 11 go to the next objection. 
A. Yes. 
Q. (By Mr. Wright) Do you know when that ring rot was found in Greg Ebe's potatoes? 
5 Improper admission of Ebe' s hearsay became even more prejudicial because the findings of 
CMS/BRR on the Ebe farm in Washington were a year after Sunrain received the potatoes 
subject to this lawsuit from Ebe Farms. There was no evidence that CMS/BRR existed on Ebe 
Farms at the time the precursor generation of the subject seed was shipped to Sunrain. 
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objection. I guess at this point to put a standing 
on the to expedite things, that any testimony regarding bacterial 
ring rot from this witness [Jeff Bragg] from Greg Ebe's is calling for hearsay. 
Q. (By Mr. Wright) Go ahead. 
The Court: Wait, wait, wait Overruled. You can answer. 
Q. (By Mr. Wright) Go ahead. 
A. One of the last places I ever thought would ever have any ring rot, this gentleman 
called me. So that's why you remember things like that Greg Ebe is a very, very good 
grower and he called me and told me himself that he had had ring rot. But this was not 
one of the lots and this was after, a year later, that it was found. 
Q. Greg Ebe himself called you and told you about ring rot on his farm? 
Mr. Avondet: Your Honor, I'll object It's hearsay. 
The Court: It's an admission. 
Mr. Avondet: Greg Ebe is not our-he's not us, your Honor. He's conveying what Mr. 
Ebe told him. 
The Court: Yes, he is. It still-it still comes under the admission exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
Mr. Avondet: But he--okay. 
The Court: Yes. 
Q. (By Mr. Wright) Go ahead. 
A. Yes because that's Yvhat you do when yoti're a go0d producer. You lay it on the lin° 
to your dients. 
Q. And do you happen to recall when Greg told you that? 
Mr. A vondet: Same objection, Your Honor. 
The Court: Overruled. 
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Hearsay. 
The Court: Overruled. 
A. I don't. In fact, Greg didn't tell me first another seed broker told me first, and I can't 
remember-I don't know when that was. 
Mr. Avondet: I'll withdraw the objection stated in the deposition. 
Q. (By Mr. Wright) And I'll just ask you if you could clarify. You said Greg Ebe called 
you, but you just said another seed broker called you? 
Mr. Avondet: I'm going to object on hearsay, Your Honor. 
The Court: Just a minute. Let me look at the answer. Hold on one minute. I'm going to 
ovem1le the objection. I think it comes in under the conditions exception [sic] to the 
hearsay rule. 
(Trial Tr., pp. 501-03.) The questions required Bragg to relate statements by Ebe. Ebe's 
statements were hearsay as defined by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Ebe' s statements to Bragg could not in any conceivable manner be deemed admissions by 
a party opponent. The district court's explanation of its rationale for the ruling is clearly 
erroneous under Rule 801. An admission has to be a party's own statement. IDAHO R. Evm. 
801(d)(2)(A). Ebe is not and has never been a Sunrain employee or agent. Ebe Farms has never 
been anything but a counterparty to a seed potato purchase and sale agreement with Sunrain. The 
testimony did not consist of statements in which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in 
its truth under Rule 801(d)(2)(B). Sunrain did not authorize Ebe's statements nor could Sunrain 
have had authority over Ebe. Id. 801(d)(2)(C). As noted, Ebe's statements were not statements 
by Sunrain' s agent or employee. Id. 801 ( d)(2)(D). They were not statements of a co-conspirator 
in furtherance of a conspiracy. Id. 801(d)(2)(E). Under the district court's interpretation of the 
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or source, 
as an admission. Such a result undermines the entire purpose of the hearsay rule. 
Sunrain's remedy for the district court's erroneous evidentiary rulings is a new trial 
where the jury is not exposed to the prejudicial testimony from Bragg concerning conversations 
with Ebe, who was not a party, about the potential presence of BRR on Ebe's farm a year after 
Sunrain purchased seed from Ebe. The admission of this testimony was not harmless error 
because Silver Creek used it to link its theory of the case together in closing argument. (See Trial 
Tr., p. 852.) Thus, due to its prejudice, the Court should reverse the district court and remand for 
a new trial. See United States v. Garcia, 528 F .3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2008). 
D. The district court erred in the manner it instructed the jury. 
1. Standard of Review. 
The Court exercises free review over the propriety of jury instructions. Henne fer v. 
Blaine Cty. Sch. Dist., 158 ldaho 242,346 P.3d 259,270 (2015); Afackay v. Four Rivers Packing 
Co., 151 Idaho 388,391,257 P.3d 755, 758 (2011). The standard for whether a particular 
instruction "should or should not have been given is whether there is evidence at trial to support 
the instruction, and whether the instruction is a correct statement of the law." Id. The Court must 
review the district court's "jury instructions as a whole to determine whether the instructions 
fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law." Id. 
2. The district court erred by issuing Instruction Nos. 7-9, 19. 
As discussed, supra, the distict court's decision to grant partial summary judgment led to 
Instructions 7, 8, 9, and 19 being given to the jury. The instructions were erroneously given as 
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The and 
rulings on partial summary judgment and the exclusion of evidence pertaining to the 
disclaimer of warranties and the limitation of remedies is hereby incorporated by reference. 
3. The district court should have instructed the jury on modification. 
Sunrain requested that the district court instruct the jury on the issue of modification of 
the Contract. It submitted proposed jury instructions on the issue. (See R Vol. III, pp. 552-55.) 
As noted in Section C(2), supra, the district court erred when it excluded the certification tags. 
The jury should have considered the issue of modification. The jury instructions given to 
the jury do not inform the jury that the Contract could have been modified through course of 
dealing or through the tags. (Id., pp. 564-89.) The instructions did not identify the issue. 
No consideration is necessary to modify a contract for the sale of goods. IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 28-2-209. A contract may be modified by mutual consent. Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail 
Ridge Med. Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709,717,330 P.3d 1067, 1075 (2014). There must only be 
a meeting of the minds and the parties must assent to the modification. Id. The fact of an 
agreement may be implied by conduct. Id. These legal principles were set forth in Sunrain's 
proposed jury instructions 33 through 37. (R Vol. III, pp. 552-56.) 
There was evidence of contract modification that warranted an instruction, both as it 
related to how the seed was sent to cattle feed and the certification tags. The evidence established 
that after the CMS test, the parties met in Picabo, Idaho. The parties reached a separate 
agreement to ship the potatoes to cattle feed. Exhibit O is a series of text messages between 
Johnson and Derbidge. There, Johnson asks for authorization to ship loads to cattle feed. (Ex. 0, 
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were out to feed. 
generally Ex. 0.) Exhibit O suggests that Johnson was willing to take the payment for the cattle 
feed, i.e., that the parties agreed that Silver Creek would be compensated for the cattle feed 
value. (Id.) The agreement to nm the seed as cattle feed and the certification tags modified the 
Contract. See discussion, supra. Thus, the district court erred. 
4. The district court erred when it instructed the jury on latent defects. 
The district court should not have instructed the jury on latent defects. Sunrain objected 
to Instruction No. 12. (Trial Tr., p. 840.) Instruction No. 12 states, "Implied warranties may arise 
and apply to goods with latent defects. A latent defect is a defect that lies dormant in the goods 
until it manifests itself sometime after delivery." (R Vol. III, p. 577.) 
The instruction was erroneous because of the issues discussed in Section C(2), supra. 
Here, a plaintiff must establish breach of implied warranties at the time (~lsale. Duffin, 126 Idaho 
at 1011, 895 P.2d at 1204. Hence, Silver Creek's burden was to establish the presence of 
CMS/BRR at the time the seed was sold to Silver Creek, over a year prior to the positive CMS 
test in 2013. Yet, the seed came back clean with a negative test in 2012 (see Def. Ex. AA) and 
the seed was also certified. (Trial Tr., p. 342.) Silver Creek presented no evidence that suggested, 
let alone established by a prepondernnce of the evidence, that the CMS/BRR w::is "latent" in the 
potatoes at the time of sale. The only connection to CMS/BRR was the erroneously admitted 
Bragg testimony about Ebe farms. (See discussion, B(2), supra.) Since that testimony should not 
have been admitted, the district court erred by instructing the jury on latent defects. 
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CMS/BRR lay dormant in the seed until 2013. Yet, nothing supports the speculation. Rather than 
base its decision on evidence, the jury instructions created a result based solely on speculation. 
E. The district court erred in awardinf! oreiudf!ment interest to Silve:r C:reek Ll'. .., 0 -- - - -
L Standard of Review. 
The standard of review for an award of prejudgment interest concerns an abuse of 
discretion. Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003). 
2. The district court erred in its decision on prejudgment interest. 
Silver Creek premised its request for prejudgment interest on Section 28-22-104 that 
Sunrain owed money to Silver Creek within thirty days of the last delivery. (R Vol. III, p. 594-
98.) Section 6 of the Contract provides that money is due within thirty days of "proof of seed 
quality standards." (PL Ex. 5.) As was argued on reconsideration, Silver Creek never produced 
evidence that the seed delivered complied with Section 4 of the Contract. (Id.) The district 
court's ruling on summary judgment constituted an overbroad ruling that all of the potatoes 
"conformed to the contract" without evidence. Silver Creek never presented any evidence of 
"proof of seed quality standards" and there was no evidence of such as of June 14, 2013. Silver 
Creek should not have received interest under Section 28-22-I04(b). 
Si1ver Creek's claim was not liquidated, nor was it ascertainable by mere mathematical 
formula until after the trial. Whether potatoes conformed to the Contract was a focal point of 
trial. The Contract required the contract price be paid only if the potatoes conformed to the 
Contract. Silver Creek conceded during trial that the range for shrink in the potatoes that were 
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to case to (Trial I.) Thus, 
have reduced the quantity of potatoes conforming to the contract by up to twenty percent. In 
short, it was not until after the full resolution of all claims that the Court knew the quantity of 
potatoes that (a) conformed to the Contract and (b) Sunrain had accepted. 
Another error committed by the district court involved the fact that the Contract agreed 
that rates to be paid depended on the yields per acre for the varieties. The Contract stated, in part, 
"Generation 3 seed will be sold to Sunrain at $13.50 per cwt In the event that the yield falls 
below 350 C\Vt the price will go to $14.50/cwi." (PL Ex. 5.) The Contract continued, "All acreage 
will be GPS monitored and volume to back up yield calculations will be done by scaled out 
weights." (Id.) The evidence at trial established that Silver Creek never used GPS monitoring. 
(Trial Tr., p. 332.) Silver Creek utilized Farm Services Agency (FSA) maps to calculate acreage 
and yields. (Id) Thus, Silver Creek failed to establish that it complied with the Contract's 
requirements as to yield verification. Until the jury rendered its verdict it was impossible to 
calculate any interest because the acreage and quantities had not been determined. (See, e.g., R 
Vol. III, pp. 573, 584-85.) Thus, the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest.6 
In Lickley v. Afox Herbold, Inc .. 133 Idaho 209. 984 P.2d 697 ( 1999), the parties entered 
into a contract for the growing and sale of potatoes. The contract set a base price of $6.15 cwt. 
Id. "Then, depending on the quality of the potatoes delivered, the contract rrovided for price 
adjustments." Id. The potatoes delivered by Lickley were substandard. Id. at 211, 984 P .2d at 
6 Sunrain won on its counterclaim. Until the jury verdict it was not possible to know any amounts 
owed by Sunrain to Silver Creek. Due to the offset, Silver Creek is not entitled to prejudgment 
interest. 
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699. 
to litigation. Id. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in Lickley's favor and required 
Herbold to pay a "reasonable price" and the district court fixed that amount at $7.55/evv1. Id. 
The appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of prejudgment interest because 
the contract price "was not readily known or calculated until after the court rendered its 
decision." Id at 213, 984 P .2d at 701. Here, for example, the Contract provided two methods for 
calculating the price for Generation 3 seed based on yield per acre. (PL Ex. 5.) The Contract also 
provided that potatoes not meeting the Contract' size requirements would be priced differently. 
(Id., § 3.) Until the jury rendered a verdict the price for the potatoes was not knowable. 
Therefore, the district court should have denied prejudgment interest. 
3. Silver Creek is not entitled to interest on warranty theories. 
Silver Creek also asserted warranty claims as to the A84 l 80-8s and the Rumbas. The 
amounts sought by Silver Creek for those potatoes vvere subject to the jury's decision on whether 
Sunrain used care in providing the potatoes. The district court instructed the jury that evidence of 
Sunrain's care bore on whether it breached warranties. The district court's instruction to the jury 
in this case is similar to a case from the Eighth Circuit, Lackawanna Leather Co. v. 1\1artin & 
Stewart, Ltd, 730 F .2d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1984 ). In that case the Court determined that in 
warranty cases, the discretion required by the jury on the issue reasonableness created an 
unliquidated damage claim. Id. The district court instructed the jury that evidence "indicating 
that the seller exercised care in the manufacture, processing, or selection of the goods is relevant 
to the issue of whether the warranty was in fact broken." (R Vol. III, p. 579.) The jury considered 
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acted providing A84I80-8s Rumbas, 
district court should have denied Silver Creek's request for interest on the warranty claims. 
4. The district court erred by not awarding Sunrain interest. 
The district court did not award Sunrain prejudgment interest on its counterclaim. The 
district court granted Sunrain's directed verdict motion on Count II of its counterclaim in the 
amount of $62,879.20. (R Vol. III, pp. 601-03.) Sunrain requested prejudgment interest. (Id., p. 
602; see also Trial Tr., pp. 790-802.) The district court did not avvard Sunrain prejudgment 
interest but ordered, "Defendant does not get interest on this amount. Defendant owed Plaintiff a 
greater amount, which was offset. Plaintiff gets interest on the difference." (R Vol. III, p. 602.) 
The district court's decision to award Silver Creek its full interest dating back to 2013 
and negating Sunrain's interest back to 2013, on a separate transaction, constitutes an abuse of 
discretion because it failed to apply the law. The essential purpose underlying awards of 
prejudgment interest is "to compensate an injured party for the time value of money." Credit 
Suisse AG v. Teufel Nursery, Inc., 156 Idaho 189,201, 321 P.3d 739, 751 (2014). Here, there 
was no dispute that Sunrain was an injured party because the money was due from Silver Creek 
for the 2013 seed back in 2013. The district court granted directed verdict on Sunrain's 
counterclaim. (R Vol. III, p. 601.) The district court should have followed Rule 54(b) and entered 
judgment for the full value of Sunrain's claim, which includes interest. See IDAHO R. Clv. P. 
54(b ). After judgments had been entered on all claims, they could have been offset. See id. 
The prejudgment interest award on the offset amount of judgments is improper because 
the district court never compensated Sunrain for the time value of its lost money. Silver Creek 
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not allowed to 
was deprived of that same benefit. Thus, the district court erred. 
F. The district court erred in awarding Silver Creek its attorney fees and costs. 
1. Standard of Review. 
The determination of whether a party is a prevailing party is committed to the district 
court's discretion. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P.3d I 114, 1125 (2009). District 
courts are not bound to award attorney fees when there are competing claims but may find that 
both parties prevailed in part or neither side prevailed. See Eighteen Afile Ranch LLC v. Nord 
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). 
2. Argument. 
The district court erred in awarding Silver Creek its entire requested attorney fees and 
costs. There was no overall prevailing party and Silver Creek was not entitled to fees. To the 
extent the Court vacates the outcome of the proceedings below, Silver Creek ceases to be the 
prevailing party and the previously decided fee award is nullified. 
There was no overall prevailing party. In Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corp., 106 Idaho 687, 
682 P.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1984), the Court of Appeals WTOte: 
Where, as here, there are claims, counterclaims and cross-claims, the mere fact that a 
party is successful in asserting or defeating c1. single claim does not mandate an award of 
fees to the prevailing party on that claim. The rule does not require that. It mandates an 
award of fees only to the party or parties who prevail "in the action." 
Id. at 693, 682 P.2d at 646. The size of a judgment is not dispositive for purposes of deciding 
who is a prevailing party. Eighteen j\tfile Ranch. LLC, 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. Instead, 
a party's success relative to its position in the lawsuit is important. Id. Courts are permitted to 
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a or not at all. )(B). 
are partially successful, it is within the district court's discretion to decline an award of 
attorney fees to either side." Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, P LLC, 152 Idaho 540, 545, 
272 P.3d 512,517 (2012) (citing Jorgensen v. Copped{;e, 148 Idaho 536,538,224 P.3d 1125, 
1127 (2010); Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003)). There is no overall 
prevailing party. Sunrain prevailed on its counterclaim to recover amounts owed for seed sold 
after the dispute over the CMS/BRR seed has arisen. Sunrain should have received a judgment 
for $62,879.70, plus 18 percent interest, from the district court. Silver Creek never really 
disputed the counterclaim but required Sunrain to prosecute the claim through trial. 
The outcome militates against the finding that Silver Creek prevailed overall. See Oakes, 
PLLC, 152 Idaho at 546, 272 P.3d at 518. The fact that Silver Creek acquired the larger 
judgment does not inherently make Silver Creek the overall prevailing party. 
The district court minimized the role of the counterclaim in the litigation. It inaccurately 
describes the counterclaim as one that "was never litigated, was never a significant issue in the 
case at any time, and was not the subject of dispute or meaningful evidence at trial." (R Vol. IV, 
pp. 786-87.) The district court's statements are not even pertinent to the issue of prevailing party. 
Sunrain as<;erted the counterclaim along with its Answer. (R Vol. I, pp. 26-37.) Sunrain 
presented evidence supporting the claim and resulted in a favorable outcome. (Trial Tr.. pp. 693-
702.) The district court erred in disregarding Sunrain's success on the counterclaim. 
In addition to the foregoing, which establishes that Silver Creek was not entitled to fees 
or costs because it was not the prevailing party, Silver Creek was not entitled to costs or fees 
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Silver made 
and Demand. In paragraph 18, Silver Creek alleged only that it was entitled to 
recover "reasonable court costs, including attorney fees, as provided by Idaho law, including 
Idaho Code§ 12-120." (R Vol. I, p. 20.) The Prayer for Relief similarly restricts Silver Creek's 
requested relief to only "reasonable court costs and attorney's fees." (Id.) The doctrine of judicial 
estoppel should preclude Silver Creek from seeking attorney fees based on the Contract. 
In Eighteen Afile Ranch, LLC, the Court addressed whether a party claiming attorney fees 
had to cite the specific statutory provision upon which the fee request is made. Eighteen Mile 
Ranch, LLC, 141 Idaho 716, 720-21, 117 P.3d 130, 134-35 (2005). The Court found that when a 
complaint only cited to Section 12-120 rather than the specific subsection of 12-120(3 ), that the 
opposing party had sufficient notice of the grounds upon which the party was seeking attorney 
fees. Id. This case, however, involves a situation where Silver Creek specifically identified the 
grounds under which it would seek attorney fees in its Complaint. Silver Creek cited Section 12-
120(3) and not the Contract. Recognizing the language of Rule 54(e)(4), Sunrain submits that 
when a party self-limits the grounds to recover fees and costs, the party cannot rely on alternative 
grounds. Here, Silver Creek failed to place Sunrain on notice of any fee claims under the 
Contract; thus, it should not have recovered its actual fees and costs. A party may not be 
required to identify ::i basis for fees. but when it does so it should be restricted that basis. 
Regardless, the district court abused its discretion in awarding Silver Creek its actual fees 
and costs. The award constitutes an unconscionable penalty. See Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 
444,451,210 P.3d 552, 559 (2009). Sunrain raised this issue before the district court. (Hr'g Tr., 
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11, 31 13.) court even the amounts by 
Creek exceeded it viewed as reasonable. (R VoL IV, p. 790.) It is unconscionable to 
award actual attorney fees and costs to Silver Creek in light of the fact that they were 
unreasonable. Moreover, Silver Creek only requested reasonable fees and costs. (R Vol. L 20.) 
It was similarly inappropriate to award costs for expert witness expenses when the 
retained experts did not appear at trial. Silver Creek submitted cost bills for Mr. Larry Braga and 
Miller Research. (R Vol. IV, p. 691 .) However, neither Braga nor Miller appeared at trial as a 
result of Sunrain prevailing on a motion in limine. (Hr' g Tr., pp. 181-90.) 
G. Sunrain should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal. 
Sunrain requests that its attorney fees be awardable on appeal following proceedings on 
remand. Sunrain recognizes that a favorable result on appeal will not result in the conclusion of 
these proceedings but in a new trial. Thus, Sunrain only requests that the Court order that its 
attorney fees be awardable by the district court in the event that Sunrain is deemed to be the 
overall prevailing party following remand. See Eighteen 1vfile Ranch, 141 Idaho at 720-21, 117 
P.3d at 134-35; IDAHO R. Crv. P. 54(d) & (e); IDAHO APP. R. 41; IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 12-120(3). 
V. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
As a result of the foregoing, the district court should be reversed and the matter remanded 
for a new trial. 
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